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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the sufficiency of turnover as a surrogate for demand for voluntary 
audit and compares the determinants in the UK and Denmark. Empirical data for the study 
were drawn from government surveys of the directors of small private companies in both 
countries, which were based on same research instrument. Bivariate tests support the 
hypothesized effects of turnover and a range of firm-specific factors suggested by economic 
rationality and agency theory. The main contribution of the study is the finding that turnover 
alone is not a sufficient surrogate for the costs and benefits of audit. The main predictors are 
turnover and a slightly different combination of management and agency factors in each 
country. The study provides a model that can be tested in other jurisdictions and its findings 
should be of interest to the accountancy profession and national regulators planning to 
introduce or revise audit exemption for small companies. 
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Summary 
 
The EU Fourth Directive allows Member States to grant exemption from the statutory audit 
to qualifying small companies within their jurisdictions. The UK introduced this option in 
1994, but set the initial turnover threshold much lower than permitted. It was then raised in a 
series of steps until the EU maxima were adopted in 2004. Denmark waited until 2006 before 
introducing the option and also started with lower thresholds than the EU maxima. Little is 
known about the accounting and auditing needs of the directors of small private companies in 
Europe. Although there is an emerging literature for the UK and some other European 
countries, there is a significant gap in respect of Denmark in English language publications. 
This study addresses these deficiencies by investigating the sufficiency of turnover as a 
surrogate for demand for voluntary audit and comparing the determinants in the UK and 
Denmark. 
 
The data are drawn from a government survey of the directors of small companies in 
Denmark (DCCA, 2005) that was based on the research instrument used for a similar survey 
commissioned by the UK’s Department of Trade and Industry (Collis, 2003). The surveys 
found that in both countries more than 40% of the sample companies would choose voluntary 
audit if eligible for exemption. This could be interpreted simply as the influence of traditional 
action on economic rationality, but the bivariate tests in this study support the hypothesized 
effects of size and a range of management and agency factors suggested by economic 
rationality and agency theory. 
 
A main contribution of the study is the finding that turnover alone is not a sufficient surrogate 
for the costs and benefits of audit. A logistic regression model identifies the main predictors 
as turnover (as a proxy for wealth at risk), combined with a slightly different combination of 
management and agency factors in each country. In both countries, management factors are 
that the cost of audit is not considered a substantial expense and it improves the quality of the 
financial information. In Denmark, an additional benefit is the check on accounting records 
and systems, which suggests that risk reduction is more important there. As far as the agency 
factors are concerned, meeting shareholders’ needs for assurance is a factor in Denmark, but 
in the UK it was specifically associated with companies that are not wholly family-owned 
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and, to a lesser extent, with companies that have external shareholders. This implies a lower 
level of trust in the UK. In Denmark, the benefit of audit in supporting agency relationships 
with the bank/lenders was significant at the 10% level, but was not significant for 
suppliers/creditors. The results for the UK companies were the reverse, which requires further 
investigation but may be due to increased use of behavioural scoring. 
 
The study offers a model that can be tested in other jurisdictions and the results should be of 
interest to the directors of small companies, the accountancy profession and those planning to 
introduce or reviewing audit requirements in national or EU company law. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The EU Fourth Company Law Directive (78/660/EEC) allows Member States to grant 
exemption from the statutory audit to qualifying small companies within their jurisdictions 
using size tests based on turnover, balance sheet total and number of employees. The UK 
introduced this option in 1994, but set the initial turnover threshold much lower than 
permitted. It was then raised in a series of steps until the EU maxima were adopted in 2004. 
Denmark waited until 2006 before introducing the option and also started with lower 
thresholds than the EU maxima. 
 
Little is known about the accounting and auditing needs of the directors of small private 
companies. Although there is an emerging literature for the UK and elsewhere in Europe, 
there is a significant gap in respect of Denmark in English language publications. This study 
addresses that deficiency by investigating the sufficiency of turnover as a surrogate for 
demand for voluntary audit and comparing the determinants in the UK and Denmark. The 
data is drawn from a government survey of the directors of small companies in Denmark 
(DCCA, 2005) that was based on the research instrument used for a UK survey 
commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (Collis, 2003). The directors’ views 
are important because they must weigh up the costs and benefits of external audit. 
 
Audit is ‘an independent examination of, and the subsequent expression of opinion on the 
financial statements’ (Owen and Law, 2005, p. 34). It is designed to demonstrate ‘the 
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completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions which, when aggregated, make up the 
financial statements’ (Power, 1997, p. 24). Exemption from statutory audit for small 
companies stems from recognition by the European Commission and national regulators that 
the burden of financial reporting falls disproportionately on small companies. It is rooted in 
the growing importance of small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) in the last 30 years. 
Since the recessions of the 1980s there has been considerable expansion in the population of 
small (0 to 49 employees) and medium (50 to 249 employees) entities. For example between 
1980 and 2007, private sector entities in the UK grew from 2.4m to 4.7m (a rise of 96%), 
mainly due to more micro entities (0 to 9 employees) and one-person companies (DTI, 1997; 
BERR, 2008). In the EU there are 23m SMEs (representing 99% of all enterprises), which 
provide more than 100m jobs. Therefore, it is not surprising that SMEs are referred to as ‘the 
backbone of Europe’s economy’ (EC, n.d.) and that the European Commission is committed 
to policies to reduce administrative burdens on them by 25% by 2010 (EC, 2007). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the regulatory 
developments in audit exemption in the UK and Denmark, while section 3 reviews the 
literature and develops hypotheses based on empirical and theoretical assumptions. Section 4 
explains the methodology and Section 5 presents the results. The paper concludes with 
comments on the contribution of the study and the implications of the results. 
 
2. Audit exemption in the EU 
 
2.1 Overview 
The origins of the EU lie in post war Europe and the establishment of the European 
Economic Community by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 with a view to creating economic and 
political benefits through a common market. At that time there was considerable diversity in 
the regulation and practice of accounting and auditing. ‘International trading, which had 
already long been a feature of European life, relied increasingly upon the services of the 
accountancy profession, but the nation-states dealt primarily with their empires rather than 
with each other. There was little reason to seek conformity in terms of infrastructures and 
controls’ (Harding, 2000, p. 593). However, EU Directives set out to achieve harmonisation 
between Member States rather than universality, ‘so that any remaining differences do not 
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constitute an impediment to the EU’s efficient operation’ (Flower, 2004, p. 98). Over time, 
the need for financial reporting regulation to better reflect the modern business environment 
(Combarros, 2000) led to the endorsement of the majority of international accounting and 
auditing standards by the European Commission
1
 and this has increased the volume and 
complexity of regulation. 
 
Article 51 of the Fourth Company Law Directive (78/660/EEC) requires all non-dormant 
limited companies to have their annual accounts audited. However, using the size criteria in 
Articles 11 and 27, national jurisdictions can provide exemption for qualifying non-publicly 
accountable small companies. Table 1 shows the proportion of small companies in the 19 
Member States in 2003 that were likely to qualify.
2
 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The general size test for a small company is that it must not exceed any two of the three size 
thresholds for two consecutive years, but national jurisdictions can set lower thresholds if 
they wish. The EU maxima are subject to revision every five years for the purpose of 
indexation. Table 2 shows the EU maxima over the last 10 years and Chart 1 gives an 
indication of turnover thresholds adopted by the EU-25 at the end of 2005.
3
 Apart from 
Denmark, Sweden and Malta, all had incorporated the audit exemption option in their 
national accounting requirements, with the Netherlands, Germany and the UK using the EU 
maxima and the remainder used country-specific size criteria. However, the degree of 
variation shown in the table must be interpreted in the context that some countries were 
formerly in the Eastern bloc, but are now transition or emerging market economies (Day and 
Taylor, 2005). During the past few years, the audit exemption thresholds in some countries in 
Europe have been increased (sometimes from very low levels) or set for the first time (FEE, 
2009). Table 3 provides the latest data for EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland. 
 
Insert Table 2, Chart 1 and Table 3 about here 
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2.2 Similarities and differences between the UK and Denmark 
The UK and Denmark are well established market economies which joined the former 
European Economic Community in 1973. There are approximately 1.2m small companies in 
the UK compared with 0.14m in Denmark (BERR, 2008; DCCA, 2006, p. 3), but in both 
countries they account for the vast majority of the corporate sector (99% and 95% 
respectively). Whereas the UK and many other European countries have only one 
professional qualification in auditing, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden have a two-
tier system ‘allowing auditors with the lower qualification to audit only small and medium-
sized firms’ (Sundgren, 1998, p.  441). In the UK all practising auditors must be members of 
a professional body, but in Denmark membership of a professional society is not mandatory 
(Christiansen and Loft, 1992). 
 
In some respects the UK appears to be an early adopter. For example the requirement to give 
a true and fair view has been part of UK company law since 1947, whereas the Danish et 
retvisende billede was not introduced until 1981; and although the Fourth Directive had 
allowed audit exemption since 1978, the UK waited 16 years before introducing it and 
Denmark waited 26 years. National accounting practices vary for a number of social, 
economic and cultural reasons (Haller and Walton, 1998), but research suggests that the UK 
and Denmark also have much in common. Gray’s seminal article in 1988 draws on 
Hofstede’s cross cultural research (1980 and 1983), which had placed the UK in the ‘Anglo’ 
culture area and Demark in the ‘Nordic’ culture area. Gray’s framework incorporated the 
impact of culture on international differences in accounting and placed the Anglo and Nordic 
cultures in the same quadrant according to a number of paired accounting dimensions. 
Accordingly, accounting values in both countries are likely to favour ‘professionalism’ rather 
than ‘statutory control’ and ‘flexibility’ rather than ‘uniformity’. In addition, they are likely 
to favour ‘optimism’ rather than ‘conservatism’ and ‘transparency’ rather than ‘secrecy’. 
 
Gray (1988) divided the extant literature into deductive studies that attempted to classify 
national systems of financial reporting (eg Mueller, 1967 and 1968; Nobes, 1983 and 1984) 
and inductive studies (eg Frank, 1979; Nair and Frank, 1980). Taking Nobes’ updated scheme 
(1998) as an example of a deductive framework, this also groups the UK and Denmark 
together in what he labelled the ‘micro/professional’ category. Here countries are 
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characterized by a legal system based on common law rather than Roman law, a large, old, 
strong accountancy profession, and financial reporting that is shareholder rather than tax 
oriented. Thus, companies strive ‘to present fair information to outside users, without detailed 
constraint of law or tax rules but with standards written by accountants’ (Alexander and 
Nobes, 2007, p. 66) and the general relationship between accounting and taxation is relatively 
weak (Alexander, Britton and Jorissen, 2007). This suggests that a comparative accounting 
study of the UK and Denmark is justified despite some differences.  
 
A final point of note is that the UK data was gathered in the context of a well established 
option, whereas the Danish data was gathered in the context of introducing the option. 
Nonetheless, the issue was contentious in the UK also because the survey was assessing the 
impact of raising the thresholds to the much higher EU maxima. This is discussed next. 
 
2.3 The case of the UK 
Company law in the UK is shaped by national policies and influenced by EU Directives 
(Fearnley and Hines, 2003). For many years, the development of company law was the 
responsibility of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), but in mid-2007 it became the 
responsibility of the new Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR).
4
 Differential reporting on the basis of size was introduced by the Companies Act 
1981, which gave small and medium-sized private companies the option of registering 
abbreviated rather than full financial statements. Under the Companies Act 2006,
5
 a non-
publicly accountable company qualifies as small or medium if it meets any two of the three 
size tests based on turnover, balance sheet total and number of employees. Apart from a 
newly incorporated entity, the conditions must have been satisfied in two of the last three 
years. The conditions for total audit exemption are that the entity must qualify as small and 
meet both financial size tests. 
 
Audit exemption was introduced in 1994 (SI 1994/1935) and allowed a company with a 
turnover up to £90,000 (lower than the EU maximum at that time), which qualified as ‘small’ 
for the purpose of filing abbreviated accounts,
6
 to forgo the statutory audit unless required by 
shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital. Companies with a turnover of 
between £90,000 and £350,000 were given the option of filing a simpler audit exemption 
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report. This lesser form of assurance was dropped in 1997, leaving companies with a turnover 
up to £350,000 exempt from the statutory audit (SI 1997/936). 
 
In 2000 the turnover threshold was increased to £1m (SI 2000/1430) and the government 
proposed raising the ceilings for all financial reporting purposes to the substantially higher 
EU maxima (DTI, 2000b). In accordance with their principle of evidence-based policy 
making (Cabinet Office, 1999), research was commissioned during the consultation period, 
including the Collis Report (2003), which provides the UK data analysed in this study. In 
January 2004, the financial thresholds were raised to the EU maxima, which for a small 
company were turnover of £5.6m and balance sheet total of £2.8m (SI 2004/16). In April 
2008, they were raised in line with the next EU revision to £6.5m turnover and £3.26m 
balance sheet total (see Chart 2). 
 
Insert Chart 2 about here 
 
2.4 The case of Denmark 
Since 2004, there has been conformity between the Danish Financial Statements Act and the 
EU size thresholds and this brought approximately 1,700 more companies into the small 
category (accounting class B). Nevertheless, all companies, regardless of size were required 
to have an external audit (DCCA, 2005) and the only concession was an option for small and 
medium companies to abridge certain notes to the accounts (DCCA, 2006). 
 
During the consultation process to assess the effect of abolishing or relaxing the statutory 
audit requirement for small companies, the Danish government commissioned the survey 
(DCCA, 2005) providing the data for this study. Following an intense political debate 
(DCCA, 2006), the Danish Folketing (Parliament) passed a bill in March 2006 exempting 
non-publicly accountable class B companies from the statutory audit if they do not exceed 
two of the following size criteria: turnover DKK 3,000,000 (€400,000), balance sheet total 
DKK 1,500,000 (€200,000), number of employees 12 (NRF, 2006, n.p.). These thresholds are 
considerably lower than the EU maxima shown in Table 2 but offer audit exemption to 
approximately 7,500 small companies (Holm and Warming-Rasmussen, 2008, p. 44). 
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3. Review of the literature 
 
In the UK, the vast majority of the financial reporting literature focuses on large listed 
companies. To a great extent, the limited amount of prior research in small private companies 
is due to the lack of a comprehensive, up-to-date sampling frame for unlisted companies and 
the low response rates that are typical in small business research (Curran and Blackburn, 
2001). A search of the academic literature failed to locate any empirical evidence from 
Denmark, although linguistic constraints meant the search was restricted to English language 
publications. This suggests the present study will address an important information gap. 
 
Among the few UK studies that have examined accounting or auditing issues for SMEs, 
generalisation is often not possible due to the small size of the sample or the exploratory 
nature of the research (for example, Freedman and Goodwin, 1993; Pratten, 1998; Seow, 
2001). In addition, international comparisons can be problematic due to differences in 
accounting practices. The periodic raising of the EU maxima for indexation purposes also 
makes comparisons complex because the definitions of size can vary over time within a 
particular jurisdiction and between Member States at any one point in time. It also means that 
the results of earlier studies may not be relevant to the full range of companies included in a 
subsequent enlarged category of ‘small’ companies.  
 
3.1 Appropriateness of the thresholds in the UK 
It has been argued that audit exemption for small companies resolves the difficulty of 
developing and enforcing auditing standards on ‘a widely diverse market, from ICI to the 
sweet shop and from Price Waterhouse to the sole practitioner’ (Fearnley and Page, 1994, p. 
81). The debate in the UK over the appropriateness of the audit exemption thresholds was 
dominated by anecdotal evidence from the regulators and the accountancy profession, with 
little consensus. For example, the Small Practitioners Association of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) survey of members in 1999 found 92% 
supported ‘exemption for all private, owner-managed, small limited companies’ (Mitchell, 
1999, p. 21). Their 2003 survey concluded there were ‘few persuasive commercial, 
professional or statutory arguments why the European [turnover] threshold of £4.8m should 
not be introduced’ (SPA, 2003, p. 3). The ICAEW described the proposal to raise the 
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thresholds to the EU maxima as ‘a positive step to ease the burdens on business’ 
(Accountancy, 2003, p. 9). However, others in the ICAEW argued that doing so would 
reduce the quality of the information put on public record (Jones, 2003). The Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) was against lifting the limits, arguing it would 
‘take away the value-added aspect which comes with the audit’ (Beckerlegge, 1999, p. 21) 
and raise the risk of fraud (Rose, 2003). 
 
3.2 Take-up of audit exemption in the UK 
There are no official statistics on the proportion of UK companies taking up audit exemption 
in the early years. A MORI survey of 176 companies (ACCA, 1998) forecast that 
approximately 40% of companies with a turnover between £350,000 and £1.5m would opt for 
audit exemption if the threshold were raised to a speculative level of £1.5m. Güntert (2000, p. 
75) reported that at least 40% of those eligible when the turnover threshold was £350,000 
were having a voluntary audit, implying a take-up rate of 60%. He adds that ‘it is not clear 
whether these companies were deliberately choosing to continue with an audit or simply 
didn’t realise that it wasn’t needed!’ In 2003, the DTI estimated that 68% of companies with 
a turnover up to £1m had taken advantage of audit exemption (DTI, 2003) and raising 
thresholds to the EU maxima would add a further 8% (DTI, 2003, Annex B, p. 4; Eaglesham, 
2003). As Tauringana and Clarke (2000) point out, statistics for the proportion of companies 
that qualify as small under company law are not available. Estimates for 2004-5 (after 
thresholds were raised to the EU maxima), suggest that 80% of non-dormant small companies 
registered audit exempt financial statements, leaving 20% choosing voluntary audit (POB, 
2006, p. 32). 
 
3.3 Size 
In both the UK and Denmark, the political rationale for introducing audit exemption was to 
reduce compliance burdens, which fall disproportionately on small companies (DTI, 1995; 
DTI, 1999b, DCCA, 2005). Implicit in this argument is the notion that below a certain size, 
the costs outweigh the benefits. In the UK, the Trade Secretary claimed the average company 
would save £5,000 from discontinuing the audit, but the accountancy profession responded 
that a more realistic figure was between £1,200 and £1,500 (Güntert, 2000). 
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A survey of 790 small private companies in the UK (Collis, 2003) found that cost was a 
factor for those deciding to discontinue the audit, but only 43 were able to provide a figure 
for the amount saved. The mode was £1,000, which matched the modal audit fee disclosed in 
the previous year’s accounts. However, case study evidence from auditors suggests that in 
many cases the audit fee is a broad estimate, due to the overlap with accounts preparation 
work (Marriott, Collis and Marriott, 2006). If the company decided to forgo the audit, it is 
likely that the preparation fees would rise. Costs would also rise if ethical standards required 
accounts preparation and audit work for small companies to be conducted by separate firms 
(Collis and Jarvis, 2005). There is evidence that the majority of small companies in the UK 
and Denmark use an external accountant to prepare their annual financial statements. In 2003, 
85% of small companies used an external accountant (Collis, 2003); in Denmark the 
proportion in 2004 was 83% (DCCA, 2005).
7
 
 
In Denmark, there were concerns in 2004 that audit fees would rise by 20% to 30% due to the 
increase in international accounting and auditing standards, which were principally aimed at 
large, listed companies (DCCA, 2005). The government recognised that the burden would be 
proportionately larger for the growing number of small companies and expressed doubt that 
‘increased control of internal procedures could be carried out meaningfully in small 
companies with no employees or so few that the cashier function is their accounts 
administration’ (DCCA, 2005, p. 5).  
 
The role of firm size as a determinant of financial reporting disclosure by listed companies is 
unclear (for example, Cormier, Magnan and Van Velthoven, 2005). Nevertheless, it is widely 
argued that costs increase in proportion to the size of the business due to increased separation 
of ownership and control and greater complexity of operations (Simunic and Stein, 1987; 
Ettredge et al., 1994). A study of 92 small private companies in the UK by Tauringana and 
Clarke (2000) found evidence of the effect of firm size on the demand for voluntary audit in 
respect of turnover, but not balance sheet total or liquidity. A larger survey (385 small private 
companies with a turnover up to £4.2m filing full accounts) found turnover, but not balance 
sheet total or number of employees, was a significant predictor of voluntary audit (Collis, 
Jarvis and Skerratt, 2004). This leads to the following cost hypothesis that larger companies 
are more likely to be able to afford voluntary audit: 
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H1 Ceteris paribus, voluntary audit is positively associated with turnover. 
 
3.4 Management factors 
It is management’s responsibility to weigh up the costs and benefits of the financial reporting 
options available to the company and it is logical to assume that the decision is based on 
economic rationality. The classical model of rationality was proposed by Weber (1968) and 
developed by others such as Hargreaves Heap (1989). Weber’s model is based on formal 
rationality (actions which can be understood because they can be interpreted in terms of some 
calculative model), which is influenced by substantive rationality (a person’s goals, principles 
or values), traditional action arising from habit or custom and affective action arising from 
emotion (Jarvis, Kitching, Curran, and Lightfoot, 1996). This provides a context for 
considering the benefits of voluntary audit to management. 
 
‘Audit is a risk reduction practice’ (Power, 1997, p. 5). An independent audit of internal 
controls can reduce information risk, inherent risk (the likelihood of a material misstatement 
arising) and control risk (the likelihood of the accounting control detecting any material 
misstatement), thereby reducing agency costs (Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995; Watson, 
Shrives and Marston, 2002; Prencipe, 2004). Whilst audit does not set out to detect fraud, it 
can play a key role in detecting material fraud and deterring potential fraudsters (Güntert, 
2000; Ramos, 2003). In some companies, inherent risk and control risk may be high. For 
example a study of 103 private companies in the USA found that owner-managers demanded 
voluntary audit ‘as compensatory control systems for the organizational loss of control 
inherent in hierarchical organizations’ (Abdel-Khalik, 1993, p. 31). Demand was also 
associated with turnover or total assets to represent the value of wealth at risk and was 
associated with demand by lenders, which increased the amount owners were willing to pay 
for audit assurance. 
 
Güntert (2000, pp. 75 and 76) argues that the small company audit gives the directors 
‘increased confidence in the reported figures, the general financial position of the business, 
the financial basis for making decisions, the reliability of the accounting system and the 
information it produces, and the early identification of trends that could lead to failure’. 
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These views are supported by empirical evidence from the UK (Collis et al., 2004), which 
found demand for voluntary audit is positively associated with the benefits of having an 
annual check on internal systems and records, and the improved quality of the information in 
the accounts. 
 
The following management hypotheses are based on the assumption that the directors make 
rational decisions based on weighing up the relative cost of audit versus the benefits of 
reducing information risk, inherent risk and control risk: 
 
H2 Ceteris paribus, voluntary audit is inversely associated with the directors’ 
perceptions of cost as a substantial expense. 
H3 Ceteris paribus, voluntary audit is positively associated with the directors’ 
perceptions that it provides a beneficial check on accounting records and systems. 
H4 Ceteris paribus, voluntary audit is positively associated with the directors’ 
perceptions that it improves the quality of financial information. 
 
3.5 Agency factors 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) offers further explanation for the directors’ 
motivation to have an external audit. It rests on the proposition that where there is 
information asymmetry in economic contracts between principal and agent, the agent will be 
willing to bear the cost of supplying information to support the relationship. Audit supports 
agency relationships by providing information to reduce uncertainty. According to Power 
(1997), a principal is anyone who is distant from the actions of management and is unable to 
verify those actions, such as external shareholders, lenders and creditors. He contends that 
information asymmetry can be present amongst internal shareholders if they lack the 
necessary skills to interpret financial information. 
 
There is still a considerable gap in the literature on the users of the financial statements of 
small companies since this was highlighted by Jarvis (1996). Surveys in Italy (Paoloni and 
Demartini, 1997) and Finland (Riistama and Vehmanen, 2004) identify the main users as 
management, the tax authorities and banks, with the two latter groups representing public 
interest (Evans, Gebhardt, Hoogendoorn, Marton, Di Petra, Mora, Thinggård, Vehmanen, and 
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Wagenhofer, 2005). A Swedish study (Svensson, 2003) shows that banks use financial 
information as the basis of credit rating and this appears to be mandatory in Germany where 
‘banks are required by law to consider financial statements in their decisions, if the credit 
amount is higher than 750,000 Euro’ (Haller and Lőffelmann, 2008, p. 3). 
 
According to the DCCA (2006, p. 4), the most important external users of financial 
statements in Denmark are credit institutions (lenders), trade creditors and the tax authorities. 
Banks are the most important providers of finance and 48% of small companies are funded 
by bank loans. Although the ability of the business to repay the loan and the future value of 
assets are important, the bank’s knowledge of the customer is the key factor in the lending 
decision, importance is also attached to the accounts being prepared by a reputable auditor. 
 
Empirical evidence from the UK (Page, 1984; Carsberg, Page, Sindall and Waring, 1985) and 
Ireland (Barker and Noonan, 1996) shows that the directors are the main users of the statutory 
accounts and a UK study shows they are used for a range of internal and external purposes 
(Collis and Jarvis, 2000 and 2002). The recipients of the annual financial statements in the 
UK are the bank/lenders, tax authorities, managers who are not shareholders and 
suppliers/trade creditors (Collis and Jarvis, 2000). This suggests the main user groups are 
similar to many of those identified by the conceptual framework for large, listed companies 
(IASC, 1989). The accounts are audited ‘to help control the conflict of interest among 
managers, shareholders and outside creditors’ (Tauringana and Clarke, 2000, p. 160) and the 
usefulness of audit to these groups is confirmed by other studies of small companies and 
accountants (POB, 2006). Collis et al., (2004) identify the key agency relationships having an 
impact on demand for voluntary audit as those with the bank/lenders and with shareholders in 
companies that are not wholly family-owned. 
 
Collis et al. (2004) argue that leverage is a noisy proxy for the agency demand for audited 
accounts by lenders. For example, an Australian study (Carey, Simnett and Tanewski, 2000) 
found level of debt and proxies for the separation of control from ownership were significant 
determinants of demand for voluntary audit. In the USA, a study of listed companies in 1926 
before statutory audit was introduced (Chow (1982) obtained significant results for leverage 
as a proxy for the use of accounting numbers in debt covenants and, to a lesser extent, size. 
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On the other hand, Ettredge, Simon, Smith and Stone (1994) found leverage was not 
significant in explaining the demand for quarterly reviews prior to filing with the SEC, whilst 
other studies (for example, Dichev and Skinner, 2002) have used leverage as a proxy for the 
closeness of a company to the constraints specified by the debt covenants. 
 
The following agency hypotheses are based on the contention that companies demand 
voluntary audit to meet the needs of shareholders, lenders and suppliers/creditors: 
 
Agency factors: 
H5 Ceteris paribus, voluntary audit is positively associated with supporting an agency 
relationship with shareholders (subsidiary hypotheses test whether this association 
is affected by family ownership or having external shareholders). 
H6 Ceteris paribus, voluntary audit is positively associated with supporting an agency 
relationship with the bank/lenders. 
H7 Ceteris paribus, voluntary audit is positively associated with supporting an agency 
relationship with suppliers/creditors. 
 
4. Methods 
 
The study addresses two research questions: 
 
 What is the sufficiency of turnover as a proxy for the demand for voluntary audit 
assurance by the directors of small private companies in the UK and Denmark? 
 Do the main determinants of voluntary audit in small private companies differ 
between the UK and Denmark? 
 
4.1 Data collection 
In the UK, a random sample of 2,633 companies was selected from FAME, a database drawn 
from the accounts registered at Companies House (Collis, 2003). It comprised active, 
independent, non-publicly accountable companies, which were selected if they met all three 
of the EU size criteria for a small company at that time (see Table 2). The data was collected 
via a postal questionnaire in April 2003. After one reminder, 790 usable replies were 
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received, giving a response rate of 30%.
8
 Although tests for non-response bias found non-
respondents were likely to have been smaller in terms of number of employees, the sample 
was representative in terms of turnover and balance sheet total. 
 
In Denmark, a statistically representative sample of 1,671 active, non-publicly accountable B 
companies was drawn from the DCCA register (DCCA, 2005). The companies were selected 
if they met any two of the three EU size criteria for a small company at that time (see Table 
2). A postal questionnaire was sent in May 2004 with one reminder, which allowed the 
opportunity to respond via the internet or telephone. A total of 553 usable replies were 
received by mail, internet or telephone, representing a response rate of 33%. 
 
4.2 Variables in the analysis 
The analysis takes the form of a logistic regression study using the following general model: 
 
Voluntary audit decision = f (size, management factors, agency factors) 
 
Table 4 describes the variables in the analysis. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
The dependent variable (VOLAUDIT) is a dummy variable (coded 1, 0) that captures 
whether the directors would have a voluntary audit if the company were eligible for 
exemption and is drawn from the survey data. The UK sample included companies that might 
already qualify for exemption, together with others that might become eligible if the 
thresholds were raised to the EU maxima. The Danish sample consisted of companies that 
might qualify for exemption if it were introduced using the EU maxima. An advantage of 
using a variable based on a predicted decision in a hypothetical situation is that it captures 
views on the relative value of audit, without the complication of the qualification criteria and 
any country differences in accounting regulation. Nevertheless, there are some reservations 
since the predictions may not be accurate. However, the reliability and validity of the 
measure is strengthen by comparing the forecasts made by the UK companies with the 
choices made the previous year, which shows a difference of only 1% (Collis, 2003).   
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Size 
The source of the UK data for TURNOVER was the 2002 financial statements on FAME, 
which was converted to £ million to aid the interpretation of the results. The Danish data for 
TURNOVER was taken from the survey in that country and was measured in DKK million 
size bands. Because the size bands were unequal (<0.5; 0.5 to 1.9; 2 to 4.9; 5 to 11.9; 12 to 
24.9; 25 to 57.9; ≥ 58), the measurement scale is ordinal rather than interval. Tauringana and 
Clarke (2000) and Collis et al. (2004) found turnover was the key size variable in this 
context. The focus on relieving the disproportionate burden placed on small companies in 
company law suggests turnover captures costs. However, some research suggests an agency 
perspective, as turnover was a significant factor when used as a proxy for separation of 
ownership and control (Chow, 1982; Tauringana and Clarke, 2000) or a measure of value of 
wealth at risk (Abdel-Khalik, 1989). 
 
Management factors 
Economic rationality (Weber, 1968, Hargreaves Heap, 1989) underpins the management 
factors examined in the analysis: COST, CHECK and QUALITY. These variables are based 
on survey data measured on an ordinal scale (5 = agree; 1 = disagree). In this study, COST is 
not a financial measure, but a construct based on perceptions of the relative cost burden. This 
offers the advantage of providing a common unit of measurement in an international study. It 
also improves the validity of the results, since some of the UK companies may never had 
their accounts audited, which would mean actual costs are not available, whilst others may 
have discontinued the audit some years earlier, which would mean only historic data would 
be available. The reliability of historic data would depend on whether the amount and year 
could be obtained or recalled accurately and adjusted to reflect current costs. Another 
problem is that the figure disclosed in the accounts might not be an accurate reflection of 
audit costs, since the fees are likely to overlap if the same firm prepares and audits the 
accounts (Collis, 2003; Marriott et al., 2006). Previous research finds two specific benefits to 
management arising from audit: the check on internal books and records and the 
improvement in the quality of the information (Collis et al., 2004). In this study, CHECK and 
QUALITY capture these two benefits. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests 
these would reduce information risk, control risk and inherent risk, which would lower 
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agency costs (Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002; 
Prencipe, 2004), thereby contributing to an economically rational decision. 
 
Agency factors 
Previous research suggests voluntary audit plays a role in controlling any conflict of interest 
between the directors, shareholders and outside creditors (Tauringana and Clarke, 2000; 
Collis et al, 2004). SHAREHLDRS, FAMILY, EXOWNERS, BANK and CREDITORS are 
dummy variables (coded 1, 0) based on the survey data, which capture the role of audit in 
supporting agency relationships. SHAREHLDRS measures the demand for audit by the 
shareholders, whilst FAMILY and EXOWNERS measure the influence of family ownership 
and the separation of ownership and control respectively. BANK and CREDITORS capture 
the role of the audited accounts in supporting agency relationships with the bank/lenders and 
suppliers/creditors. 
 
The regression analysis was preceded by preliminary tests of association and difference 
between the two groups in the dependent variable and each independent variable (non-
responses were excluded). Non-parametric tests were used because the variables were 
measured on a ratio scale with a non-normal distribution or on a nominal or ordinal scale, 
thus failing to meet the basic assumptions of parametric statistics. These require variables to 
be measured on a metric scale, drawn from a population with a normal distribution and to 
demonstrate homogeneity of variance and independence between variables (Field, 2000). 
 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis. Strictly speaking, the 
mean cannot be calculated for ordinal data, since the ranks represent nominal categories and 
is given merely as an indication of central tendency. Table 6 presents a correlation matrix of 
the ordinal and ratio independent variables, which was examined for evidence of 
collinearity.
9
 The results are satisfactory since none of the correlation coefficients indicate 
high levels that would increase the probability that a good predictor of an outcome being 
found non-significant (Kervin, 1992). 
 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Univariate analysis  
In the UK ‘the large majority of companies have a turnover of less than £250,000, with the 
numbers larger than this tailing off dramatically. Equally importantly, the majority (over half 
a million) have only one or two shareholders’ (DTI, 2000a, p. 270). Table 7 confirms that the 
vast majority of the UK and Danish companies were indeed at the smaller end of scale 
according to several measures of size. In addition, most were closely held since few had 
external shareholders and the large proportion were wholly family-owned or one-person 
businesses. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
In the UK 57% of the companies supported the government’s proposal to raise the thresholds 
for audit exemption to the EU maxima for a small company. In Denmark 31% were in favour 
of giving audit exemption up to the EU maxima for a small company and 33% were in favour 
of making it available to the smallest companies only or for those with a record of unqualified 
annual or tax accounts (DCCA, 2005). The dependent variable (VOLAUDIT) is based on 
whether the company would have a voluntary audit if it were eligible for exemption. The 
proportions in both countries were remarkably similar: 43% of directors in the UK and 41% 
in Denmark. The remaining Danish companies (59%) would either stop having an audit or 
choose a less extensive form of assurance if an alternative were available.
10
 
 
5.2 Preliminary tests 
Mann-Whitney tests were conducted to examine the independence of the two groups in the 
dependent variable VOLAUDIT and the independent variables measured on a non-parametric 
ratio scale (TURNOVER) or ordinal scale (COST, CHECK, QUALITY). As can be seen in 
Table 8, all the results are significant (p ≤ .01). 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
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Chi-square tests were used to measure the association between the two groups in the 
dependent variable (VOLAUDIT) and the independent variables measured on a dichotomous 
nominal scale (SHAREHLDRS, FAMILY, EXOWNERS, BANK, CREDITORS). Table 9 
shows significant results (p ≤ .01) for all variables in respect of the UK companies. However, 
FAMILY and EXOWNERS are not significant for the Danish companies. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
5.3 Sufficiency of turnover 
The logistic regression models in Table 10 examine the sufficiency of turnover as a surrogate 
for the management and agency factors as predictors of voluntary audit: 
 
 In Panel A size, as measured by TURNOVER, is used as the sole predictor. For both 
countries, the results are highly significant (p ≤ .01), but the pseudo R2 indicates that 
the model explains only 18% of the variance in the two groups in VOLAUDIT for the 
UK companies and 3% for the Danish companies.  
 In Panel B the size and management factors are regressed and TURNOVER is used as 
a proxy for the agency factors All the results are highly significant (p ≤ .01) and the 
regression coefficient (B) for COST shows the expected negative relationship with 
VOLAUDIT. The pseudo R
2
 indicates an improved goodness of fit compared with 
Panel A, explaining 40% of the variance for the UK companies and 46% for the 
Danish companies.  
 In Panel C the size and the agency factors are regressed and TURNOVER is used as a 
proxy for the management factors. The results for the UK companies show that the 
regression coefficient (B) for FAMILY has the expected negative sign and the results 
for the agency variables are significant (p ≤ .05), apart from BANK, which is not 
significant. The results for the Danish companies are highly significant (p ≤ .01) apart 
from TURNOVER which is significant at the 10% level (p ≤ .10). The pseudo R2 also 
indicates an improved goodness of fit compared with Panel A. This third model 
explains 42% of the variance for the UK companies, but only 29% for the Danish 
companies. 
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Insert Table 10 about here 
 
5.4 Size, management and agency factors 
The final model shown in Table 11 identifies the significant predictors of voluntary audit 
when the size, management and agency factors are entered into a multiple regression model: 
 
Size 
The results for TURNOVER are significant (p ≤ .05) and provide evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis for H1 in both countries. 
 
Management factors 
The results for COST and QUALITY in both countries are significant (p ≤ .05) and the 
correlation coefficient (B) for COST has the expected negative sign. This is evidence to reject 
the null hypotheses for H2 and H4 in both countries. The result for CHECK is highly 
significant for the Danish companies (p ≤ .01), but not significant for the UK companies, 
which is evidence to reject the null hypothesis for H3 in Demark. 
 
Agency factors 
The result for SHAREHLDRS is highly significant for the Danish companies (p ≤ .01), but 
not for the UK companies, which provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis for H5 for 
Denmark. In respect of the UK companies, the correlation coefficient for FAMILY carries 
the expected negative sign and the result is highly significant (p ≤ .01). The UK result for 
EXOWNERS is significant at the 10% level (p ≤ .10). Therefore, the null hypothesis for H5 
in respect of family ownership and external shareholders is rejected for the UK companies. 
BANK is significant at the 10% level for the Danish companies only, whereas CREDITORS 
is significant at the 10% level for the UK companies (p ≤ .10). This provides evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis for H5 in respect of the bank/lenders in Denmark and 
suppliers/creditors in the UK. 
 
Examining the goodness of fit, the pseudo R
2
 indicates that the model is superior to those in 
Table 10, explaining 54% of the variance in the UK companies and 53% in the Danish 
companies. 
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Insert Table 11 about here 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
6.1 Contribution and discussion 
This comparative study contributes to the meagre literature on the accounting and auditing 
needs of the directors of small private companies in Europe by investigating the sufficiency 
of turnover as a proxy for the voluntary demand for audit assurance and the main 
determinants of voluntary audit in the UK and Denmark. It has analysed empirical data from 
a government sponsored survey of the directors of small companies in Denmark (DCCA, 
2005) that was based on the questionnaire used for a similar survey commissioned by the UK 
government (Collis, 2003). The focus of the UK survey was on the impact of raising the 
thresholds for audit exemption to the EU maxima, whereas the Danish survey was on the first 
time adoption of audit exemption. The large size of the samples (UK 790; Denmark 553) and 
high response rates (UK 30%; Denmark 33%) compared with many other SME studies both 
add to the reliability of the results. 
 
Despite audit exemption being available to most small private companies in the UK for 
nearly a decade, and being a new phenomenon in Denmark, the directors of a significant 
proportion of companies in both countries (43% and 41% respectively) predicted the 
company would have a voluntary audit. This behaviour could be explained as the influence of 
traditional action on economic rationality (Weber, 1968), but the study identifies other 
determinants. 
 
Whilst turnover alone can predict audit demand in both countries, it is not a full and sufficient 
surrogate for the motivation of the directors to opt for voluntary audit (Table 10). The final 
model (Table 11) supports the hypothesized effects of size as measured by turnover and a 
range of management and agency factors, which differ slightly between the two countries.  
Abdel-Khalik (1989) argued that turnover is a proxy for the wealth at risk, whilst others 
(Simunic and Stein, 1987; Ettredge et al., 1994) have suggested it represents agency costs 
and the separation of ownership and control, which increase in proportion as a result of more 
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complex operations and greater delegation of control. Since relative cost and agency factors 
were included in the model, Abdel-Khalik’s explanation is adopted, but the role of turnover is 
uncertain and requires further investigation. 
 
In both countries, the management factors determining voluntary audit are that cost is not 
considered a substantial expense and audit provides the benefit of improving the quality of 
the financial information. The latter confirms previous research in the UK (Collis et al., 
2004). In Denmark, an additional benefit is the check on accounting records and systems, 
which also supports Collis et al. (2004), although it was not significant for the enlarged 
category of UK companies.
11
 This suggests that reducing information risk, inherent risk and 
control risk is more important in Denmark than in the UK. 
 
The study supports the hypothesized effects of agency relationships (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) with shareholders in Denmark, but in the UK this was specifically associated with 
companies that were not wholly family-owned and, to a lesser extent, with companies that 
have external shareholders. This implies a lower level of trust in UK companies with 
unrelated shareholders than in Denmark. This implies a lower level of trust in UK companies, 
but one difference between the two countries is that the needs of minority shareholders 
requiring audited accounts are protected under UK company law, which was not part of the 
proposal in Denmark. To a lesser extent, the benefit of audit to support agency relationships 
with the bank/lenders was a factor in Denmark but was not significant in the case of 
suppliers/creditors. However, these two results were reversed for the UK companies. The non 
significant result for the UK companies regarding demand from the bank/lenders conflicts 
with the findings of Tauringana and Clarke (2000) and Collis et al. (2004). However, the data 
for these previous studies was collected in 1999/2000, when audit exemption in the UK was 
fairly new, whereas banks now place greater emphasis on credit scoring and behavioural 
scoring (BBA, 2006). This requires further investigation. 
 
6.2 Limitations 
This study has focused on companies disclosing turnover in their financial statements since 
this is one of the key size tests and, unlike total assets and number of employees, turnover is 
less affected by industry. However, some caution is needed when drawing conclusions from 
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the study as this means that UK companies filing abbreviated accounts were excluded and 
some of these may have chosen a voluntary audit of the statutory accounts for shareholders. 
Moreover, despite high response rates in both countries, the smallest companies were not 
fully represented. This is one of the main challenges in small business research and is caused 
by lack of representation in the available sampling frames, the relatively short life of many 
micro entities and the reluctance of owner-managers to participate due to business pressures 
(Curran and Blackburn, 2001). A further consideration is the relative lack of research into the 
accounting and auditing needs of SMEs compared to listed companies. This means 
explanatory theories are less developed and there is greater reliance on empirical data. A final 
point of note is that since this analysis is based on the directors’ predicted audit decision, 
there is scope for future research to investigate actual practices.
12
 
 
6.3 Implications for preparers, users and regulators 
The results demonstrate that there are two groups within the small company category in the 
UK and Denmark with differing assurance needs and a significant proportion of directors 
consider the benefits of external audit outweigh the costs. This is good news for the 
accountancy profession (particularly auditors in small and medium-sized practices whose 
main fee income is from small companies). It will also be reassuring to those who use audited 
financial statements for assessing and monitoring lending and credit risk. However, lenders 
and creditors have the economic power to ensure that their information needs are met. 
Therefore, regulators may want to protect the needs of minority shareholders in small 
companies who require the assurance of an independent audit. 
 
This study offers a model that can be tested in other jurisdictions. It has identified minor 
country differences in the determinants of voluntary audit, which suggests the European 
Commission’s policy of harmonisation rather than standardisation should be retained. The 
results of this study should be of interest to the directors of small companies, the accountancy 
profession and those planning to introduce or review audit exemption options in national or 
EU company law. 
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Chart 1 
Turnover thresholds for audit exemption for EU-25 in 2005 
 
 
Adapted from EC, 2006, p. 7 and EC, 2005 
 
Chart 2 
Changes in the financial thresholds for audit exemption in the UK 1994 – 2008 
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Table 1 
Small companies as a percentage of total companies in EU-19 
 
Country % small in 2003 
Estonia 97 
Belgium, Spain, Sweden, UK 95 
Finland, France, Ireland 94 
Denmark 93 
Austria 90 
Germany, Netherlands 89 
Greece, Italy, Portugal 85 
Czech Republic 83 
Slovenia 78 
Luxembourg 77 
Hungary 67 
Average 94 
 
Adapted from EC, 2006, p. 7 
 
Table 2 
EU maxima for audit exemption 
 
 1998 1999  2003 2008 
Turnover €5.0m €6.25m €7.30m €8.8m 
Balance sheet total €2.5m   €3.125m €3.65m €4.4m 
Average number of employees 50 50 50 50 
 
Adapted from DTI, 1999a, Annex B; DTI, 2000, p. 270; and EC, 2006, p. 6 
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Table 3 
Audit exemption thresholds in EU, Norway and Switzerland in 2009 
 
Audit exemption thresholds Countries % 
Maximum or near maximum thresholds: 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, 
Slovenia, Switzerland
1
, United Kingdom) 
11 38 
Balance sheet total between €2.5m and €3m 
Net turnover between €5m and €5.7m 
(Greece, Poland and Spain) 
  3 10 
Balance sheet total between €1m and €1.8m 
Net turnover between €2m and €3.1m 
(Czech Republic, France (except for SA
2
), Lithuania, Portugal and Slovak Republic
1
) 
4 (1) 14 
Balance sheet total: between €0.5m and €0.9m 
Net turnover: between €1m and €1.8m 
(Estonia
1
) 
  1 4 
Balance sheet total: between €0.1m and €0.5m 
Net turnover: between €0.2m and €0.1m 
(Bulgaria, Denmark
1
, Finland
3
, Hungary
1
 and Latvia
1
) 
  5 17 
Balance sheet total/ net turnover: €0 
(Cyprus
4
, France (for SA
2
), Norway, Malta
4
, Sweden
5
) 
  5 17 
Total 29 100 
 
Notes: 
1
 Introduction or increase in 2007, 2008 or 2009 
2
 Société Anonyme 
3 
Decrease in 2007 
4
 For tax purposes 
5
 Expected to increase to maximum thresholds in 2010 
 
Adapted from FEE, 2009, p. 7 
 
Table 4 
Description of variables 
 
Variable Description Expected sign Hypothesis tested 
VOLAUDIT Whether company would have a voluntary audit if eligible (DV)   
TURNOVER Size of company as measured by turnover + H1 
COST Extent of agreement that audit cost is a substantial expense - H2 
CHECK Extent of agreement that audit provides a beneficial check on 
accounting records and systems 
+ H3 
QUALITY Extent of agreement that audit improves the quality of the 
financial information 
+ H4 
SHAREHLDRS Whether audit is required for shareholders + H5 
FAMILY Whether company is wholly family-owned - H5 
EXOWNERS Whether company has external owners without access to internal 
financial information  
+ H5 
BANK UK: Whether the statutory accounts are given to the bank/lenders 
Denmark: Whether audit is required for the bank/lenders 
+ H6 
CREDITORS UK: Whether audit has a positive effect on credit rating 
Denmark: Whether audit is required for suppliers/creditors 
+ H7 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable UK Denmark 
 N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD 
VOLAUDIT 772 0 1 N/A N/A 509 0 1 N/A N/A 
TURNOVER 790 <0.01 4.74 0.69 1.119 530 < 0.5 ≤ 58 N/A N/A 
COST 474 1 5 3.09 1.526 523 1 4 2.94 .895 
CHECK 697 1 5 4.05 1.191 523 1 4 3.01 .834 
QUALITY 687 1 5 3.35 1.379 512 1 4 2.96 .819 
SHAREHLDRS 529 0 1 N/A N/A 542 0 1 N/A N/A 
FAMILY 785 0 1 N/A N/A 537 0 1 N/A N/A 
EXOWNERS 722 0 1 N/A N/A 519 0 1 N/A N/A 
BANK 790 0 1 N/A N/A 542 0 1 N/A N/A 
CREDITORS 497 0 1 N/A N/A 542 0 1 N/A N/A 
 
N/A = Calculation of the mean and the standard deviation are not appropriate for variables measured on an 
unequal interval or ordinal scale 
 
 
Table 6 
Spearman’s correlation matrix of ratio and ordinal variables 
 
Variable UK Denmark 
  TURNOVER COST CHECK QUALITY TURNOVER COST CHECK QUALITY 
TURNOVER 1.000    1.000    
COST  -.095* 1.000     .018 1.000   
CHECK     .106** -.039 1.000       .145**    -.280** 1.000  
QUALITY     .112** -.041      .606** 1.000   .025    -.193**      .673** 1.000 
 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 7 
Key characteristics of the sample companies 
 
Characteristic UK (N = 790) Denmark (N = 553) 
Turnover Up to £1m 80% Up to 12m DKK 82% 
Balance sheet total Up to £1.4m 89% Up to 12m DKK 88% 
Employees Up to 10 78% Up to 10 80% 
Total shareholders 1 or 2 69% 1 or 2 84% 
External ownership Presence of shareholder(s) 
without access to internal 
financial information 
17% Presence of shareholder(s) 
without access to internal 
financial information 
26% 
Family ownership Wholly family-owned 68% Wholly family-owned 58% 
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Table 8 
Mann-Whitney tests on non-parametric ratio and ordinal variables 
 
Variable UK Denmark 
 N Mann-Whitney U Z p N Mann-Whitney U Z p 
TURNOVER 772 40203.5 -10.731 .000 489 23997.5 -3.017 .003 
COST 470 20276.0   -5.095 .000 488 14903.0 -9.587 .000 
CHECK 682 37629.0   -8.519 .000 488 15217.0 -9.751 .000 
QUALITY 672 32083.0   -9.864 .000 478 16508.0 -8.249 .000 
 
 
Table 9 
Chi-square tests on nominal variables 
 
Variable UK Denmark 
 N Chi-square* df p N Chi-square* df p 
SHAREHLDRS 517 57.770 1 .000 507 86.736 1 .000 
FAMILY 767 32.212 1 .000 498   2.392 1 .122 
EXOWNERS 706 16.573 1 .000 484   0.229 1 .632 
BANK 772 48.452 1 .000 507 51.822 1 .000 
CREDITORS 488 61.313 1 .000 507 33.648 1 .000 
 
*With Yate’s correction for continuity 
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Table 10 
Demand for voluntary audit: Sufficiency of turnover 
 
Variable UK Denmark 
 B SE Wald p B SE Wald p 
Panel A Size         
TURNOVER   .834 .097 73.909 .000 .182 .058 9.725 .002 
Constant -.790 .092 74.183 .000 -.987 .202 23.937 .000 
Panel B Size and management factors         
TURNOVER .592 .117 25.526 .000 .258 .077 11.244 .001 
COST -.356 .079 20.553 .000 -1.150 .158 52.820 .000 
CHECK .377 .132 8.199 .004 .911 .233 15.316 .000 
QUALITY .558 .107 27.059 .000 .663 .218 9.284 .002 
Constant -2.677 .520 26.530 .000 -2.859 .818 12.206 .000 
Panel C Size and agency factors         
TURNOVER .773 .176 19.217 .000 .121 .006 3.372 .066 
SHAREHLDRS 1.207 .354 11.606 .001 1.456 .224 42.287 .000 
FAMILY -.799 .277 8.289 .004 No correlation 
EXOWNERS   .937 .386 5.892 .015 No correlation 
BANK   .362 .288 1.574 .210 .718 .252 8.143 .004 
CREDITORS 1.171 .368 10.103 .001 .790 .291 7.370 .007 
Constant -2.072 .411 25.467 .000 -2.085 .278 56.083 .000 
         
Model summaries:                    Panel A N = 772 N = 489 
 Chi-square 112.648, df 1,  p .000 Chi-square 9.873, df 1, p .002 
 Pseudo R
2
 .182 Pseudo R
2
 .027 
   
Panel B N = 451 N = 432 
 Chi-square 158.923, df 4, p .000 Chi-square 177.351, df 4, p .000 
 Pseudo R
2
 .396 Pseudo R
2
 .456 
   
Panel C N = 366 N = 487 
 Chi-square 138.952, df 6, p .000 Chi-square 115.269, df 4, p .000 
 Pseudo R
2
 .421 Pseudo R
2 
.286 
 
Table 11 
Demand for voluntary audit: Size, management and agency factors 
 
 UK Denmark 
Variable B SE Wald p B SE Wald p 
TURNOVER .604 .196 9.465 .002 .200 .082 5.912 .015 
COST -.296 .112 6.968 .008 -1.106 .170 42.264 .000 
CHECK .343 .230 2.222 .136 .796 .248 10.259 .001 
QUALITY .509 .180 8.001 .005 .549 .231 5.663 .017 
SHAREHLDRS .255 .490 .272 .602 1.242 .277 20.067 .000 
FAMILY -1.289 .393 10.754 .001 No correlation 
EXOWNERS .945 .520 3.299 .069 No correlation 
BANK .140 .382 .133 .715 .519 .313 2.743 .098 
CREDITORS .850 .478 3.161 .075 517 .355 2.114 .146 
Constant -2.672 .857 9.723 .002 -3.109 .880 12.474 .000 
         
Model summaries: N = 254 N = 431 
 Chi-square 130.334, df 9,  p .000 Chi-square 216.360, df 7, p .000 
 Pseudo R
2
 .538 Pseudo R
2
 .534 
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1
 Since 2005, group companies with a listing on an EU regulated stock exchange have been required to prepare 
their consolidated accounts using IFRS.  
2
 2003 is the latest year for which figures were available. The original publication notes that the statistics are 
merely indicative since the database contained only a limited part of the population of companies. 
3
 These comprised the original members of the European Economic Community created by the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. They were joined by Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK in 1973; by Greece in 1981; by Portugal and Spain in 1986; by Austria, Finland and Sweden 
in 1995; and by Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia in 
2004. By the end of 2007, the total had risen to 27 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. 
4
 As a result of further restructuring in 2009, BERR was replaced by the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS).  
5
 This replaced the Companies Act 1985. 
6
 The Companies Act 2006 (c.46, Part 15, Chapter 10) allows qualifying small and medium-sized companies to 
register either full or abbreviated financial statements (sections 444-5), but they must provide full financial 
statements for their shareholders. Under section 449, if the company is not exempt from audit or has chosen 
voluntary audit, the abbreviated accounts must be accompanied by a special auditor’s report stating that the 
company is entitled to deliver abbreviated accounts and they have been prepared in accordance with the 
regulations. The special report must set out the full auditor’s report if the latter was qualified or stated that 
accounts, records or returns were inadequate; accounts did not agree with records and returns; failed to obtain 
necessary information. 
7
 Latest survey evidence puts the figure at 77% for small companies and 88% for medium-sized companies 
(Collis, 2008). 
8
 At the start of 2003, the population of small companies was 873,320 (SBS, 2004, Table 2) and a sample of 790 
greatly exceeds the minimum acceptable size of 384 (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970, p. 608). 
9
 SHAREHLDRS, FAMILY, EXOWNERS, BANK and CREDITORS are not suitable for this procedure as they 
are measured on a nominal scale. 
10
 Views on adoption of any alternative form of assurance were not collected in the UK. However, this was 
addressed subsequently by Collis (2008). 
11
 The definition of ‘small’ was higher than that used by Collis et al. (2004) due to increases in the EU maxima.  
12
 This was done in the UK by Collis (2008). 
